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STIMULATING THE STIMULUS:  
U.S. CONTROLLED SUBSIDIARIES  
AND I.R.C. 965 
Matthew Jerome Mauntel* 
Abstract: Recently, there has been much debate about how and when to 
balance the federal budget. Economists have examined how to safely raise 
taxes without stifling crucial growth in a fragile economic climate. This 
Note argues that a method already exists for tapping additional, secure 
sources of funding, namely the taxation of repatriated earnings from for-
eign subsidiaries. The Note explores the advantages and disadvantages of 
reenacting a tax break on foreign profits returning to the U.S. and con-
cludes that the reenactment of this tax break coupled with major revision 
of the tax code will improve the taxation of U.S. businesses with subsidiar-
ies abroad. These two acts are keys to a more honest and more effectual 
international tax system. 
Introduction 
As the economic stimulus bill of 2009 passed through the houses 
of Congress, there were innumerable attempts to support pet projects 
and self-righteous causes in the name of fixing the U.S. economy.1 With 
the logic of “what’s a few billion more anyway?,” Congress has tried to 
give more money to schools, alternative energy, and law enforcement, 
for example.2 In the midst of these power plays was an idea that may 
help fund these potential catalysts of economic growth: the resurrec-
tion of a tax holiday for repatriation of untaxed income earned by mul-
tinational companies.3 
Like individuals and small businesses, large multinational compa-
nies that do business in the United States must pay taxes to the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
* Matthew Mauntel is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. He would like to thank his parents and friends who enabled him to suc-
ceed in producing this Note. 
1See David M. Herszenhorn, Bipartisan Push to Reduce Costs of Stimulus Plan, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 6, 2009, at A1. 
2 See id. 
3 Ryan J. Donmoyer, Lilly, Oracle Lose Senate Bid for Overseas-Profits Tax Discount, Bloom-
berg, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&refer=cone 
ws& tkr=CSCO%3AUS&sid=anUvSkYMAtT8. 
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government.4 Due to a strange confluence of corporate and tax law, 
however, these companies are able to defer taxes on their income 
earned in foreign-based subsidiaries.5 Multinationals store their income 
in countries with low tax rates, enabling them to avoid the higher U.S. 
rates they should be paying.6 The amount held in these foreign havens 
is staggering.7 For instance, IRS data indicates that there were $804 bil-
lion in earnings and profits of controlled subsidiaries in 2005, with only 
$362 billion actually repatriated and taxed, but at a sharply reduced 
rate.8 
Congress has made prior attempts to tax this income at normal 
rates9 but instead has settled for a sharply reduced tax rate in the hope 
that U.S.-based parent companies will create domestic jobs.10 The re-
cession and subsequent stimulus bills have put the United States gov-
ernment in a financially horrifying position.11 Some argue that any 
source of income that has not been utilized thus far should be pursued 
with alacrity.12 Others opine that the federal government should begin 
encouraging businesses to repatriate their income back into the United 
States by either reducing permanently or eliminating the tax on in-
come earned abroad by subsidiaries, allowing them to finance their 
own bailouts.13 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 The 
Works of Benjamin Franklin 409, 410 ( Jared Sparks ed., Hilliard Gray 1840) (“[I]n this 
world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”). 
5 See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 
14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 667, 668 (2007) (elucidating the anomaly created by basic corpo-
rate and tax laws). 
6 See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Multinationals Accumulate to Repatriate, 53 
Tax Notes Int’l 376, 376 (2009) [hereinafter Multinationals Accumulate]. 
7 See Lee A Sheppard & Martin A Sullivan, Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 53 
Tax Notes Int’l 275, 276 (2009) [hereinafter Repatriation Aid]. 
8 See id. 
9 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2008). All references hereinafter to “I.R.C.” are to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986. 
10 See I.R.C. § 965; see Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 276–77 (“Economists concluded 
that the repatriation holiday produced a windfall gain for companies with large amounts 
of accumulated earnings in low-tax countries. They found that companies used the funds 
principally for share repurchases. And they found that companies that benefited from the 
holiday were no more likely to spend on growing their businesses than companies that did 
not benefit.”). 
11 See Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Dept. of Treasury, 2008 Combined Statement of Receipts, 
Outlays, and Balances 9, available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/index.html. 
12 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376. 
13 See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Pol-
icy in a Global Setting, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 937, 957 (2004) (arguing that U.S. taxation of foreign 
entities reduces their ability to effectively compete in a global scale). 
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This Note outlines the problem of taxing income of foreign sub-
sidiaries and why the reenactment of section 965 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code failed. Part I describes the background of the problem and 
the attempt by members of Congress to reenact section 965. Part II 
then explores the legal framework and implications of section 965. Part 
III analyzes the effects of successfully levying taxes on foreign subsidiar-
ies and those of giving up attempts at such taxation. 
I. Background 
A. Why Is There a Problem? 
The United States subscribes to a “resident-based” tax system, 
which taxes corporations either “created or organized in the United 
States or under the law of the United States or of any State,”14 or “effec-
tively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the Unit-
ed States.”15 According to this definition, corporations organized in the 
United States with subsidiaries abroad are taxed on income from their 
business operations worldwide.16 Their foreign subsidiaries, which have 
been organized within foreign jurisdictions, are excluded from these 
U.S. income taxes, however, as long as their income is not realized by 
the U.S.-based parent.17 The only vehicle through which the parent 
company may realize the income of the subsidiary is the stock which is 
controlled by the parent.18 Realization of the subsidiary’s income by the 
parent corporation occurs if the parent either sells its stock in the sub-
sidiary or if the subsidiary pays dividends on that stock.19 
Such a system of worldwide taxation would result in a double tax 
on foreign-earned profits, effectively eliminating any chance of U.S. 
investment abroad; therefore, a tax credit is given to offset the differ-
ence between the two rates.20 The credit is equal to the tax rate applied 
                                                                                                                      
14 I.R.C. § 11 (stating that all corporations are taxed on their income, but that is fur-
ther limited to domestic corporations by I.R.C. § 882); I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (stating that a 
“United States person” includes any domestic corporation for income tax purposes). 
15 I.R.C. § 882(a)(1). 
16 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (“A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable in-
come of every corporation.”) (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (defining as “taxable 
income [that income] which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or busi-
ness within the United States”). 
17 See Boise, supra note 5, at 667. 
18 See id. at 667–68. 
19 See I.R.C. § 11(d). 
20 See I.R.C. §§ 901, 902 (stating that taxes paid to a foreign state are considered paid 
to the United States). 
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in the foreign country in which the subsidiary is organized.21 If the for-
eign tax rate is greater than the U.S. rate, the corporation can use the 
surplus tax credit to offset other profits; however, if the foreign rate is 
lower than that of the U.S., as it typically is, then the company must pay 
the resulting balance to the U.S.22 
The problem with taxing income of foreign subsidiaries with U.S.-
based parent companies occurs because of the convergence of two ba-
sic concepts.23 First, in our legal system, corporations are treated as in-
dividuals separate from their shareholders.24 If a subsidiary is formed 
outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, it is considered a for-
eign individual.25 The upshot of this principle is that parent companies 
and their controlled subsidiaries are legally separate individuals despite 
the fact that their stock is often wholly owned by a U.S.-based corpora-
tion.26 So long as income is not transferred from subsidiary to parent, 
the parent corporations are taxed only on the income they earn, not on 
the income of other companies they control.27 The United States only 
taxes individuals within its jurisdiction, so corporate entities established 
outside of the country are not U.S. residents and therefore are not 
taxed.28 Even controlled foreign subsidiary corporations whose entire 
cache of stock is owned by a U.S. parent company are still absolutely 
                                                                                                                      
21 See I.R.C. § 902(b)(1)(B) (stating that “foreign corporation shall be deemed to have 
paid the same proportion of such other member’s post-1986 foreign income taxes as 
would be determined under subsection (a) if such foreign corporation were a domestic 
corporation”). 
22 See id. For example, the U.S. tax rate for these companies is typically 35%, and the 
hypothetical tax rate in Ireland is 25%. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D). A subsidiary of a U.S. com-
pany in Ireland would be taxed by the Irish government at its 25% rate and then a credit 
would be given by the U.S. for that amount. See id. The company would then have to pay 
the remaining 10% (i.e. 35%-25%). See id. 
23 See Boise, supra note 5, at 668. 
24 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a corporation as: 
[a]n entity (usu. a business) having authority under law to act as a single per-
son distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock 
and exist indefinitely; a group or succession of persons established in accor-
dance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personal-
ity distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart 
from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it. 
See Black’s Law Dictionary 151 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). 
25 See id. at 152. 
26 See id. at 151. 
27 See I.R.C. §§ 11(a), (d), 882(a). 
28 See id. (assuming the foreign-based corporations do not engage in trade or business 
within the U.S. as defined in § 882). 
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separate foreign juridical persons in the eyes of U.S. law, including the 
tax code.29 
Second, shareholders of a company are not obligated to pay taxes 
on the profits of the company until those profits are formally realized 
through a dividend payment or sale of the stock.30 Thus, as long as for-
eign-based subsidiaries do not pay dividends on their stock, no income 
is reported.31 Because the U.S. parents do not report the income made 
by their controlled foreign subsidiaries, no taxes are collected.32 
These two concepts when considered together create a gigantic 
loophole through which parent companies in the United States with 
subsidiaries abroad are able to defer payment of income tax indefi-
nitely.33 Given that the foreign subsidiary is not a part of the parent, but 
merely has the parent as its controlling shareholder, taxes on income 
made abroad do not have to be paid until a dividend is declared or 
stock is sold.34 Unsurprisingly, these companies have taken to exploit-
ing this loophole and are hoarding over half a trillion dollars in sub-
sidiary profits in countries where taxes are low by not paying dividends 
and holding on to stock.35 
B. What Has Congress Done About It? 
In 2006 and 2007 there was a 72% increase in unrepatriated in-
come in foreign subsidiaries, swelling the figure from $558 billion to 
$958 billion.36 These enormous figures mean that the U.S. is being 
robbed of up to $335.3 billion in unpaid tax revenue.37 There has been, 
however, heated debate about whether the U.S. should be taxing in-
come of foreign corporations at all.38 Unfazed by these disagreements, 
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. §§ 11(b), 882. 
30 See id. § 61(a); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (“[N]either under the 
Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise has Congress power to tax without apportionment a 
true stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, 
as income of the stockholder.”). 
31 See I.R.C. § 61(a); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219. 
32 See I.R.C. § 61(a); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219. 
33 See discussion infra Part II A–B. 
34 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), (7). 
35 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 377 (“By the end of fiscal 2007 these 
multinationals had replenished their stash of unrepatriated earnings to $518 billion—a 72 
percent increase in two years.”). 
36 Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 281. 
37 See I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D). The calculation is done using the 35% tax rate and multi-
plying it with the possible $958 billion of foreign unrepatriated income. See id. 
38 Compare Desai & Hines, supra note 13, at 957 (arguing that these taxes reduce these 
companies’ ability to compete in foreign markets), with Multinationals Accumulate, supra 
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Congress has amended the tax code in an effort to access this huge de-
posit of untaxed income, with mixed results.39 
One of the latest amendments of this type was section 965 of the 
Internal Revenue Code.40 Section 965 was enacted by Congress in 2004 
as a part of the American Jobs Creation Act.41 The new provision gave 
multinational companies in the United States an 85% tax break on in-
come derived from subsidiaries in foreign countries if that income was 
repatriated through cash dividends to the U.S. parent company within 
a one-year timeframe.42 
There were several stipulations to this incredible tax break, the 
most important of which was the Domestic Reinvestment Plan (DRIP) 
requirement, which stated that companies had to spend their dividends 
on job creation measures in the U.S.43 The DRIP requirements were 
not as effective at creating American jobs as Congress had hoped, but 
rather the cash was used to shore up domestic corporate health.44 The 
plans were disregarded outright by a number of companies while oth-
ers were slightly more subtle in their methods, though the result was 
the same: spending to directly increase their stock value rather than 
invest in the limited domestic market.45 
                                                                                                                      
note 6, at 376 (arguing that U.S. corporations should pay income taxes, but that section 
965 was ineffective in compelling them to do so). 
39 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 276–
77. 
40 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 271, 118 Stat. 1418 
(adding § 965 to the I.R.C.). 
41 See id. 
42 See I.R.C. § 965. 
43 See id. at (b)(4). 
44 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 278–79. 
Higher levels of repatriations, however, were not associated with increased 
domestic capital expenditures, domestic employment, or research and devel-
opment expenditures. In fact, increased repatriations in response to the 
[Homeland Investment Act (HIA)] had small negative, but insignificant, ef-
fects on each of these measures of activity in instrumental variable specifica-
tions. Even firms that increased contributions to congressmen responsible for 
drafting the HIA and who belonged to a lobbying coalition that asserted that 
the tax holiday would allow them to increase domestic investment did not 
significantly increase their domestic expenditures. 
Id. at 278–79 (quoting Dhammika Dharmapala et al., The Unintended Consequences of the 
Homeland Investment Act: Implications for Financial Constraints, Governance, and Interna-
tional Policy 4 (Sept. 20, 2008) (unpublished statistical analysis), available at http://www. 
people.hbs.edu/ffoley/HIA.pdf. 
45 See id. at 277. 
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The consequence of section 965 was a 5.25% tax on $315 billion, 
resulting in $16.5 billion in revenue for the U.S. Treasury.46 One of the 
side-effects of this tax holiday was that companies moved even more in-
tangible assets abroad, seemingly biding their time for a second holiday 
and decreasing their domestic value.47 The immediately lucrative effects 
coupled with a renewed call for a tax holiday on offshore assets have 
brought the reenactment of section 965 to the congressional forefront.48 
Corporations continue their lobbying efforts in the face of a recent set-
back in which a reenactment was rejected.49 Despite the U.S. govern-
ment’s dire need for tax money and the need to bring assets into the 
domestic, taxable arena, Congress has rejected a second tax holiday.50 
II. Discussion 
A. How Are Corporations Taxed? 
The United States has a “resident-based” income tax system.51 A 
resident-based tax system is one in which only those who are citizens or 
residents are taxed; thus, foreign individuals are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the tax code.52 This concept is codified in section 11 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).53 The reach of section 11 to foreign 
corporations is limited by section 11(d), which limits taxes on foreign 
corporations to only those allowed by section 882.54 Section 882 defines 
taxable income from foreign corporations as the “gross income which 
is effectively connected with the conduct of . . . business within the 
United States.”55 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 276 (5.25% of $315 billion is $16.5 billion). 
47 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376. 
48 See Donmoyer, supra note 3. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See I.R.C. § 11 (stating that all corporations are taxed on their income, but limiting 
its scope to domestic corporations pursuant to I.R.C. § 882); I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (stating 
that a “United States person” includes any domestic corporation for income tax purposes). 
52 See id. §§ 11, 882, 7701(a)(30); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States § 412(1)(a) (1987) (explaining that a state may exercise juris-
diction to tax an individual who is a resident of the state, who does business in the state, or 
who owns property in the state). 
53 I.R.C. § 11 (limiting the taxation of individuals to those who either reside in the 
state or whose income is derived from actions or properties in the state, as codified in later 
sections of the I.R.C.). 
54 See id. § 11(d). 
55 Id. § 882(a)(2). 
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The U.S. Federal Government has made an effort to impose taxes 
upon foreign companies which are controlled by U.S.-based parents.56 
A controlled company is defined as: 
any foreign corporation if more than 50 percent of—  
(1) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of 
such corporation entitled to vote, or 
(2) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned 
(within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is considered as 
owned by applying the rules of ownership of section 958(b), 
by United States shareholders on any day during the taxable 
year of such foreign corporation.57 
This means that any foreign corporation which has over 50% of its stock 
owned by a U.S. individual, including a corporation, is considered “con-
trolled” for the purposes of taxation.58 
A controlled foreign corporation is not subject to United States in-
come taxation due to the residence-based income tax system to which 
the U.S. subscribes.59 Corporations are considered individuals under 
U.S. law, and their citizenship is based on where they are organized.60 
Due to this system of legal organization of corporations in the United 
States, a corporation founded in a foreign jurisdiction is considered a 
foreign citizen.61 Therefore, even if a foreign company is “controlled” 
according to I.R.C. section 957(a), it is still not taxed on its income due 
to its status as a non-resident.62 
The next logical question is: why does the U.S. government not tax 
the controlling domestic company? The answer involves a basic princi-
ple of the I.R.C.63 Section 61(a) of the I.R.C. states that stockholders are 
obligated to pay any income taxes on the sale of property or gain from 
dividends, but not valuation increases in the stock they possess.64 In-
stead of a tax on stock valuation changes, the federal government taxes 
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. §§ 951–964, 1291–1298 (codifying anti-deferral rules for controlled corpora-
tions and anti-deferral rules on passive foreign investment). 
57 Id. § 957(a). 
58 See id. 
59 See I.R.C. §§ 11, 882, 7701(a)(30). 
60 See Black’s Law Dictionary 151, 152 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). 
61 See id. at 152. 
62 See I.R.C. §§ 11, 882. This tax treatment is subject to whether the company has par-
ticipated in business within the United States. See id. § 882(a)(2). 
63 See id. § 61(a). 
64 Id. § 61(a)(3), (7). 
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profits from stock when the income is “realized.”65 For the income to be 
realized through stock the stock must be sold or a dividend awarded.66 
Consequently, the only way to tax profits from a foreign company 
with no business in the U.S., but with a U.S. stockholder is to tax the 
domestic stockholder.67 The U.S. government taxes any dividends dis-
tributed or profits from the sale of stock, but these two events do not 
occur often for large controlled multinational companies.68 Controlled 
foreign corporations and their U.S. parents are well aware of the gov-
ernment’s limitations and thus do not pay dividends.69 Instead, domes-
tic companies allow their foreign subsidiaries to hold the profits in their 
local jurisdiction,70 which invariably has a lower tax rate.71 If no divi-
dends are paid, and if the controlling corporation does not sell its 
stock, the foreign corporation escapes U.S. income taxation.72 
B. The Problem and the Response 
The problem is that U.S. companies who want to avoid paying U.S. 
income taxes on their business abroad merely have to set up a foreign 
subsidiary.73 The result is a legally separate entity that is able to pursue 
business ventures in foreign nations and enrich the parent company’s 
stock value while never paying a cent of U.S. income tax on its active 
profits.74 The United States is left in a conundrum: to continue in its 
flailing attempts at taxation of foreign subsidiaries, or to rethink the 
current tax code to take into account the realities of the situation.75 
Congress is well aware of these multinational monies and has en-
acted provisions of the tax code to tax the profits of U.S.-controlled 
companies abroad.76 These provisions discuss passive income from 
highly mobile sources but do not address the general income a com-
pany makes in ordinary business.77 U.S. parent companies that control 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 212 (1920). 
66 See id. 
67 See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a), 882, 7701(a)(30); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 212. 
68 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3), (7); Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376. 
69 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376. 
70 See id. 
71 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 276. 
72 See I.R.C. § 61(a). 
73 See id. §§ 11, 882. 
74 See id. §§ 11, 882, 951–964, 1291–1298 (codifying that domestically-controlled for-
eign companies are taxed only on their passive income, if at all). 
75 See Joann M. Weiner, Bring Back the U.S. Repatriation Tax Holiday, 53 Tax Notes Int’l 
283, 283–84 (2009). 
76 See I.R.C. §§ 951–964, 1291–1298. 
77 See id. §§ 1291–1298. 
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foreign subsidiaries are subject to taxation on all profits from passive to 
active income.78 They are able to defer taxation on the profits of con-
trolled companies until they repatriate the income from those subsidi-
aries in the form of dividends.79 The deferred income taxes owed by 
U.S. parent companies on profits made in their controlled foreign sub-
sidiaries continue to be out of reach unless Congress amends the tax 
code in order to take this practice into account.80 
In another attempt at effective worldwide taxation, Congress 
passed the American Jobs Creation Act in 2004, section 271 of which 
added new section 965 of the Internal Revenue Code (section 965).81 
Section 965 granted a temporary tax holiday for U.S. multinational 
companies holding profits and intangible assets abroad.82 The section 
allowed dividends paid by controlled foreign companies to their U.S. 
parent shareholders to be taxed at a sharply reduced rate if they paid 
those dividends within a limited timeframe.83 Congress’ goal was to les-
sen the burden of taxation on foreign profits as a means of encourag-
ing corporations to repatriate their profits in dividends and bring in at 
least a portion of the tax revenue.84 
Section 965 “allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 85 percent 
of the cash dividends” received during the year the section was active by 
shareholders “from controlled foreign corporations.”85 The original rate 
of income taxation for the majority of these multinational corporations 
was 35%, making the 85% reduced rate equal 5.25%.86 The maximum 
amount allowed to be repatriated was the greatest of: (1) $500 million; 
(2) the amount listed on a financial statement as permanently rein-
vested outside the United States; or (3) failing sufficient information on 
the financial statement, the amount of tax liability attributable to earn-
                                                                                                                      
78 See U.S. Const. amend. XVI; I.R.C. § 11. 
79 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). 
80 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 290–91. 
81 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 271, 118 Stat. 1418. 
82 See I.R.C. § 965. 
83 See id. 
84 See H.R. Rep. No. 108-548(I), at 146 (2004). 
The Committee observes that the residual U.S. tax imposed on the repatriation 
of foreign earnings can serve as a disincentive to repatriate these earnings. The 
Committee believes that a temporary reduction in the U.S. tax on repatriated 
dividends will stimulate the U.S. domestic economy by triggering the repatria-
tion of foreign earnings that otherwise would have remained abroad. 
Id. 
85 I.R.C. § 965(a)(1). 
86 See id. § 11. The calculation is made by multiplying the applicable tax rate of 35% by 
the remaining tax of 15% (100%-85%) to get 5.25%. See id. 
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ings reinvested outside the United States divided by 35%.87 Pfizer repa-
triated more income than any other U.S. parent company, totaling a 
whopping $37 billion itself, which was more than 10% of the entire 
amount repatriated by all companies under section 965.88 The amount 
Pfizer would have paid without the tax break is nearly $13 billion.89 In-
stead, the company paid only about $2 billion under the auspices of sec-
tion 965’s holiday.90 
Rather than freely allowing corporations to gain the benefit of de-
creased tax rates, Congress included stipulations as to what companies 
must do with their tax savings.91 Section 965 required the corporations 
that wished to take advantage of the tax holiday to do so within the ap-
plicable year and also required to enact an investment plan referred to 
as a DRIP.92 The DRIP had to be approved by the president, CEO, or 
other equivalent company official and was supposed to map out how 
the dividend would be spent.93 The dividend was allowed to be spent on 
reinvestment in the United States, including workers, infrastructure, 
research and development, capital investments, or financial stabiliza-
tion for job retention or creation.94 Expenditures on executive com-
pensation were specifically disallowed.95 
The result was not the titular “American Jobs Creation,” but rather 
the enrichment of large multinationals who had deferred paying bil-
lions.96 Since money is fungible, the repatriating companies merely had 
to move money out of an area like research and development, move in 
some of the dollars from repatriation, and then spend the money for-
mally marked for R&D on stock buybacks and executive compensa-
tion.97 For instance, a company could be initially spending $100 million 
on workers and infrastructure and then choose to repatriate $100 mil-
lion from a foreign controlled subsidiary. In accordance with section 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. § 965(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
88 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376, 379 (stating that $362 billion was 
repatriated, and Pfizer alone repatriated $37 billion). 
89 See I.R.C. § 11 (multiplying Pfizer’s repatriated $37 billion by the 35% original tax 
rate). 
90 See id. §§ 11, 965 (multiplying Pfizer’s repatriated $37 billion by the 5.25% reduced 
tax rate). 
91 See id. § 965(b)(4). 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See I.R.C. § 965(b)(4). 
96 See American Jobs Creation Act § 271; Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 379 
(demonstrating that corporations had been withholding billions prior to the tax holiday). 
97 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
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965, the company enacts a DRIP stating that it will spend the $100 mil-
lion from repatriation on workers and infrastructure, and then it shifts 
the original $100 million to executive compensation.98 The result is no 
net increase in the areas of job creation targeted by Congress, but with 
no recourse possible by the Internal Revenue Service since the com-
pany technically did follow the letter, albeit not the spirit, of the law.99 
These large multinational companies avoided the DRIP require-
ment by merely moving around their money.100 Only a few stated out-
right that they were using the repatriated funds for stock buybacks and 
executive compensation, but an analysis of other corporations’ finances 
revealed that such a practice was widespread.101 The companies merely 
took money out of areas in which the DRIP required them to invest and 
then replaced that money with funds from the repatriated dividends.102 
Many of the companies even cut jobs after they repatriated billions.103 
Despite these well-known results, some members of Congress proposed 
reenacting section 965 in February 2009 as a part of the $819 billion 
economic stimulus package.104 Such practices fulfilled the require-
ments of the DRIP, but dodged Congress’ intended effects on stimulat-
ing domestic investment.105 
On its face, such activity looks like intentional misuse of the funds 
Congress intended for certain explicit purposes; however, some tax writ-
ers see the effects of section 965 as desirable.106 The debate between 
those that viewed section 965 as a success and those that saw it as a fail-
ure is directly related to whether those individuals believe there should 
be a reenactment of the provision.107 The proposal was voted down on 
February 4, 2009, but the discussion of what to do about foreign subsidi-
aries’ profits continues.108 It is informative to apply each side of the de-
                                                                                                                      
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Roy Clemons & Michael R. Kinney, An Analysis of the Tax Holiday for Repatriation 
Under the Jobs Act, 52 Tax Notes 759, 761 (2008). 
101 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
102 See Clemons & Kinney, supra note 100, at 761. 
103 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
104 See Chuck O’Toole, Stimulus Bill Passes House, Grows in Senate, 122 Tax Notes 568, 
568, 570 (2009). 
105 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
106 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 284–85, 291. 
107 Compare Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 281 (stating that repeated tax holidays 
would increase profit-shifting to offshore subsidiaries, moving more investment dollars 
outside the U.S.), with Weiner, supra note 75, at 286 (stating that the current system of 
taxation actively discourages corporations from bringing income back into the U.S., which 
would be at least temporarily relieved by another tax holiday). 
108 See Donmoyer, supra note 3; Weiner, supra note 75, at 283. 
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bate’s reasoning, along with the practices in Canada, in assessing wheth-
er the reenactment of section 965 was rightfully voted down or if it 
should have been given closer consideration by Congress and passed.109 
C. The Debate 
On one hand, the stated original purpose of section 965, to boost 
American job creation, effectively failed.110 The argument on this side 
of the debate focuses on how the repatriating companies have taken 
advantage of a flaw in the tax code111 and have circumvented the stated 
goal of Congress: to grow American jobs as emphasized in the DRIP 
requirement.112 There has been an increase in unrepatriated earnings 
since the enactment of section 965, indicating that companies are pre-
paring to take advantage of a new wave of tax breaks.113 Some state that 
corporations have benefited hand over fist and that they should not be 
allowed to do so at the expense of American jobs and investment.114 
On the other hand, the U.S. Treasury saw a tax revenue increase of 
$16.4 billion.115 The increase is attributable to the federal government at 
least temporarily adopting a competitive worldwide taxation strategy.116 
This side argues that without such a change, the “reduced” revenue of 
$16.4 billion would have been $0.117 Furthermore, the only way to per-
manently increase the tax revenues from controlled foreign subsidiaries 
is to remove the repatriation disincentive from multinational busi-
ness.118 
In addition, Canada has installed a permanent tax “holiday” in 
that its Income Tax Act does not impose taxes on dividends received 
from controlled foreign corporations as long as a tax treaty has been 
established with the country of the subsidiary.119 The various treaties 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Donmoyer, supra note 3. 
110 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
111 See id. at 276–78. 
112 See id. at 277. 
113 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 377. 
114 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 281, 283. 
115 See Weiner, supra note 755, at 283. 
116 See id. at 289–90. 
117 See id. at 283. 
118 See H.R. Rep. No. 108-548(I), at 146 (2004). 
119 See Income Tax Act (I.T.A.), R.S.C., ch. 1, pt. I, § 126(7) (1985) (Can.); Convention 
Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, U.S.-Can., art. XXIV, § 2(b), Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11087, 1469 U.N.T.S. 189 [here-
inafter U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty] (“[A] company which is a resident of Canada shall be al-
lowed to deduct in computing its taxable income any dividend received by it out of the ex-
empt surplus of a foreign affiliate which is a resident of the United States.”). 
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with foreign countries currently amount to an exemption on 90% of all 
repatriated profits.120 The Canadian government is planning an over-
haul of its system with a possible result of the complete exemption of 
foreign profits from taxation.121 A recent government-appointed advi-
sory board has recommended that the Canadian government 
“[b]roaden the existing exemption system to cover all foreign active 
business income earned by foreign affiliates.”122 
Even considering the current system of taxation, there are major 
advantages to the Canadian model in that taxes on dividends received 
from foreign corporations controlled by Canadian citizens (including 
corporations) are reduced, provided there is a treaty with the applicable 
country.123 If Canada completes its overhaul, it will have an increased 
advantage over the U.S. system, which will result in less investment in 
the U.S. and greater disincentive for controlled foreign subsidiaries to 
repatriate their earnings to the U.S.124 
III. Analysis 
A. Going Forward 
Section 965 did not spur American job creation as Congress in-
tended in enacting it.125 Instead of investing in the prescribed areas 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Weiner, supra note 755, at 284. The Canadian tax code states: 
“tax-exempt income” means income of a taxpayer from a source in a country 
in respect of which 
(a) the taxpayer is, because of a tax treaty with that country, entitled to an ex-
emption from all income or profits taxes, imposed in that country, to which 
the treaty applies, and 
(b) no income or profits tax to which the treaty does not apply is imposed in 
any country other than Canada; 
I.T.A., ch. 1, pt. I, § 126(7). 
121 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 284. 
122 Nathan Boidman, Reforming Canada’s International Tax Regime: Final Recommenda-
tions, Part 2, 53 Tax Notes Int’l 345, 359 (2009). 
123 See I.T.A., § 91(5). 
124 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 290 (quoting Michael Mundaca, Deputy Assistant Trea-
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125 See Lisa M. Nadal, Repatriation Gluttony—Was It Worth It?, 119 Tax Notes 1228, 1230 
(2008). 
Pfizer, for example, which took advantage of the DRD and repatriated the 
largest amount (around $ 37 billion), started a number of layoffs in its U.S. 
workforce (around 3,500 jobs) and closed U.S. factories in 2005. Ford Motor 
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listed in the DRIP requirement, companies shifted around their new 
capital in order to fund share repurchases.126 Some companies even cut 
jobs in the United States after repatriating billions in cash dividends.127 
American workers are left wondering where the DRIP requirement of 
reinvestment has gone and what has happened to their jobs. 
It is enlightening to learn what types of companies decided to take 
advantage of the tax break provided by section 965.128 According to the 
IRS’s Statistics of Income Bulletin, the two types of companies that bene-
fited most from the holiday were pharmaceutical and computer/ elec-
tronics companies.129 These two types of companies accounted for about 
50% of the total repatriated income qualifying under the requirements 
of section 965.130 Additionally, one particular company, Pfizer, accounted 
for 10% of the total repatriated earnings itself.131 Other companies like 
Ford and Eli-Lilly repatriated large amounts and then cut jobs while us-
ing their money for share buybacks.132 
While it is true that the steeply reduced tax revenues from repatri-
ated earnings are better than nothing, the gift of a tax holiday to corpo-
rations for avoiding their taxes is not a solution.133 Nevertheless, this at-
tempt by Congress to break into offshore tax strongholds was widely 
criticized as too much on one hand and not enough on the other.134 
There has been a significant amount of debate as to whether the United 
                                                                                                                      
Co., which also took advantage of the DRD and repatriated around $ 850 mil-
lion, started its layoff of around 10,000 U.S. workers in 2005. Merck also an-
nounced layoffs of 7,000 workers in 2005 and repatriated $ 15.9 billion. Other 
multinationals that repatriated under section 965 and also cut jobs include 
Motorola, Procter & Gamble, PepsiCo, and Honeywell International. 
Id. 
126 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
127 See Nadal, supra note 125, at 1230. 
128 See Clemons & Kinney, supra note 100, at 762 (showing the breakdown of repatriat-
ing companies by industry). 
129 See Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend Deduction, 27 IRS Stats. Income 
Bull., No. 4, 102, 104 (2008) (showing that pharmaceutical companies accounted for 31.6% 
of total repatriated dividends qualifying for the holiday and that computer/electronics com-
panies accounted for 18.4% of the total repatriated dividends qualifying for the holiday). 
130 See id. (illustrating in Figure A, column 6 that “computer and electronic equip-
ment” and “pharmaceutical and medicine” companies repatriated 18.4% and 31.6%, re-
spectively). 
131 Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376, 379 (demonstrating that Pfizer repa-
triated $37 billion of the total $362 billion repatriated under the Jobs Act). 
132 See id.; Clemons & Kinney, supra note 100, at 760; Nadal, supra note 101, at 1230. 
133 See Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376. 
134 Compare Desai & Hines, supra note 13, at 957 (arguing for a permanent tax decrease 
or elimination), with Multinationals Accumulate, supra note 6, at 376 (arguing against an-
other tax holiday and for more effective taxation). 
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States should be attempting to tax these foreign corporations at all.135 
Some argue that an effective tax on these revenue streams would give 
the U.S. Treasury a meaningful boost of income, which could then be 
used to jumpstart the economy through government stimulus legisla-
tion.136 Others contend that such a tax may also impede the competi-
tiveness of U.S.-based companies, further harming the domestic econ-
omy.137 
B. The Pro-Reenactment Argument 
A number of tax writers maintain a much more positive story 
about the effects of 2004’s American Jobs Creation Act, specifically in 
reference to section 965.138 They argue that the title of the act was a red 
herring and distracts from a more objective view of the substantial ben-
efits of the act.139 Writers such as Joann M. Weiner of Tax Notes Inter-
national view the repatriation tax holiday through the lens of previous 
experience and see a net gain overall instead of focusing solely on the 
act’s title.140 
Looking at the amount of repatriation that would have occurred if 
the American Jobs Creation Act had not been passed versus the 
amount that subsequently did occur makes the picture look a little less 
grim.141 Instead of viewing the results as $128 billion in taxes that should 
have been raised, but only $16 billion actually raised, the act should be 
evaluated considering that $16 billion in income came into the U.S. 
Treasury as opposed to $0 in income.142 From this perspective, it seems 
                                                                                                                      
135 Compare Repatriation Aid, supra 7, at 281 (stating that repeated tax holidays would 
increase profit-shifting to offshore subsidiaries, moving more investment dollars outside 
the U.S.), with Weiner, supra note 75, at 286 (stating that the current system of taxation 
actively discourages corporations from bringing income back into the U.S., which would 
be at least temporarily relieved by another tax holiday). 
136 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 276. 
137 See Michael C. Durst, International Tax Reform and a Corporate Rate Cut for Stimulus, Ef-
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tax in the U.S. coupled with taxation abroad makes U.S. companies less competitive than 
their foreign counterparts). 
138 See Allen Sinai, Special Report: Macroeconomic Effects of a Reduction in the Effective Tax Rate 
on Repatriated Foreign Subsidiary Earnings in a Credit- and Liquidity-Constrained Environment, (Am. 
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139 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 286 (“To be blunt, creating jobs in the United States 
was not a requirement of the Jobs Act.”). 
140 See id. at 283–84. 
141 See id. at 283. 
142 See id. 
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much stranger for there to be as much argument against such a meas-
ure.143 
Opponents of a reenactment of section 965 focus too much on the 
name of the act and not enough on the actual effects.144 There has been 
much wailing and gnashing of teeth about how companies did not fol-
low the DRIP requirements but rather took their money and did what 
they wanted with it.145 From a corporation’s perspective, however, it fol-
lowed the instructions and requirements of section 965 to the very letter 
and used its tax savings to solidify its financial position.146 Section 965 
did not categorically ban any type of spending because Congress knew it 
could not be the judge of what was best for any individual company, es-
pecially with legislation as sweeping as the American Jobs Creation 
Act.147 
Because banks have become more reluctant to lend credit during 
this recession, it makes sense for companies to utilize their own cash 
invested abroad rather than borrow from creditors domestically.148 It is 
inherently cheaper for corporations to use money they already have 
rather than pay someone else to borrow, which is a major principle bol-
stering the pro-reenactment argument.149 Since companies are in dire 
financial straits and are trying to stem the freefall of their stock, they 
should be able to use their money any way they see fit.150 
It is certainly not coincidental that the only one of the Big Three 
U.S. automakers not to request bailout money, Ford, took major advan-
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144 See id. at 286. 
145 See Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
146 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 286. 
Finally, it appears that one concern with the temporary dividends received de-
duction is not that firms failed to use the funds as allowed, but that the bill al-
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to undertake any kind of expenditure that contributed to financial stabilization 
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Id. 
147 See I.R.S. Notice 2005-10, 2005-1 C.B. 474, § 5.01 (Feb. 7, 2005) (noting that “th[e] 
list of permitted investments is not an exclusive list, [and therefore] other investments in 
the United States made pursuant to a domestic reinvestment plan may also be permitted 
investments”). 
148 See Weiner, supra note 75, at 287. 
149 See id. 
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tage of the section 965 tax holiday.151 Ford was then able to use that 
money to invest in its domestic operations and foreign subsidiaries, al-
lowing it to continue the fight for survival.152 The fact that the company 
cut jobs is not necessarily a product of poor spending of its tax savings, 
given that it is entirely possible that even more jobs would have been 
cut otherwise.153 
Indeed, the only major change that should be made to section 965 
prior to reenactment is a complete elimination of the DRIP require-
ment.154 The results of 2004 verify this conclusion, noting that the re-
quirement was ineffective and that companies are in the best position 
to assess their financial situation and spend their tax savings accord-
ingly.155 Moreover, the reenactment of the tax holiday should herald a 
redevelopment of the international corporate taxation system in the 
United States.156 Congress should enact a reduced level of taxation 
more commensurate with other industrialized nations, eliminate the 
foreign earned income tax, and close the loopholes, collectively allow-
ing for more effective enforcement of existing taxation principles.157 
C. The Anti-Reenactment Argument 
Other tax scholars have taken the questionably extreme position 
that section 965 was an abject failure and that the only worse course of 
action would be to reenact the legislation to repeat the process.158 
These writers argue that the title of the act, the American Jobs Creation 
Act, was wholly instructive in how to judge the results of all portions of 
the act, including those of section 965 repatriations.159 Writers like Tax 
Notes International’s Lee A. Sheppard and Martin A. Sullivan view the 
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(The Berkeley Elec. Press (bepress), Working Paper No. 1937, 2007), available at http://law.  
epress.com/expresso/eps/1937; Multinationals Repatriate, supra note 7, at 276. 
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tion.”); Repatriation Aid, supra note 7, at 277. 
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effects of section 965 through the frame of the American Jobs Creation 
Act.160 From their viewpoint, the unalienable purpose of the legislation 
was to create additional jobs for Americans or at least maintain the cur-
rent number of jobs, ignoring the dire economic environment.161 
When examining the effects of the section 965 repatriations, these 
scholars examine strictly how the repatriated dividends were used.162 
Unsurprisingly, they are disappointed when they find that the vast ma-
jority of multinational companies who took advantage of the tax holi-
day effectively used the cash for purposes other than employee wages 
and research and development.163 Because the dividend cash was fun-
gible, the DRIP requirements were neatly skirted by the corporations, 
and thus, they argue, the legislation failed.164 
They further contend that companies neither were then, nor are 
now, in need of the additional liquidity provided by section 965 and, 
rather, have a problem with excessive debt.165 Such a debt problem, or 
debt overhang, is the actual key to the financial crisis and the very rea-
son why access to cash stored in foreign subsidiaries is not the solution, 
nor is it even particularly helpful.166 
As a response to this debt overhang problem in the private sector, 
the public sector has purchased that debt and, additionally, has allowed 
these companies to gain access to foreign-held capital at bargain-
basement cost.167 The idea is that companies will be able to use their 
newfound liquidity to inflate their own stock prices through stock buy-
backs, which in turn will create a more stable market and fuel de-
mand.168 
The problem with this simplistic approach, the anti-reenactment 
camp contends, is that it incentivizes the very behavior it purports to 
prevent: the hoarding of income abroad in anticipation of the next hol-
iday.169 Some contend that the solution involves directly dealing with 
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the debt by minimizing it or writing it down.170 They admit that such an 
approach will hurt and likely anger the creditors of these toxic assets, 
but insist that it is a far superior way of handling the crisis.171 
They conclude that a reenactment of section 965 will again allow 
large multinational companies to repatriate assets at extremely low 
prices, but the influx of cash into their coffers will only falsely inflate 
their stock prices with share buybacks, which would result in a set of 
circumstances uncomfortably similar to those immediately preceding 
the present credit crisis.172 Since the original enactment of section 965 
in 2004, multinational companies have had increased rates of profit-
shifting to controlled foreign subsidiaries.173 These increases have been 
particularly evident in companies with considerable amounts of intan-
gible assets, such as pharmaceutical companies or bank-holding com-
panies, which were big players in the initial repatriation tax holiday.174 
A second wave of repatriation will disincentivize any further repatria-
tion during periods of normal taxation, encouraging companies to lie 
in wait for the next tax holiday and also shift lucrative intangible assets 
to subsidiaries in low tax-base countries.175 
These writers would argue that since the vast majority of compa-
nies who took advantage of section 965 did not create jobs in the Unit-
ed States and a reenactment to increase liquidity would not help the 
economic crisis, Congress was correct in rejecting the reenactment of 
section 965.176 They maintain that reenactment of section 965 would 
distract from the problems of the international taxation system in the 
United States.177 The writers believe that the tax system should be over-
hauled in order to end deferral and capture the taxes on profits of for-
eign subsidiaries more effectively.178 
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D. Canada Offers Guidance 
As both the anti-reenactment and pro-reenactment camps agree, 
the international corporate taxation system in the United States needs 
serious reform.179 As noted above, Canada has a system of international 
corporate taxation closely resembling that of the United States.180 Can-
ada is currently overhauling its tax system in order to tax international 
subsidiaries more effectively while encouraging investment back into 
their domestic operations.181 As one of the United States’ two border-
ing countries and the country’s top trade partner, Canada’s experiment 
with international corporate tax reform can prove especially useful as 
the United States seeks to improve its system.182 
The Canadian system currently exempts from taxation any income 
derived from foreign operations in countries with which there is an in-
formation-sharing treaty.183 The Canadian system has an overall exemp-
tion of over 90% for foreign-earned corporate income; thus, less than 
10% of all income from foreign subsidiaries is derived from countries 
with which Canada has not developed a treaty.184 An advisory panel has 
recommended a complete exemption for all foreign-earned corporate 
income, not limited to treaty countries.185 Such a system, if imple-
mented in the United States in combination with a similarly lower cor-
porate tax rate, could make investment in the United States much 
more lucrative.186 
The United States should adopt several features of the Canadian 
international corporate tax reform.187 First, the need for overhaul of the 
system of United States taxation on foreign-earned corporate income is 
an immediate one, as shown by Canada’s action.188 Furthermore, a low-
er base tax is called for if the United States is to compete with other in-
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dustrialized nations in attracting foreign investment.189 Corporations 
will not repatriate earnings if the cost of doing business is radically 
greater in the United States than other desirable countries.190 Third, a 
major exemption for the bulk of foreign-earned corporate profits is ne-
cessary to stay relevant in the business world.191 The United States and 
Canada are two of the last industrialized countries to attempt worldwide 
taxation and Canada is prudently in the process of abandoning it after 
finding it uncompetitive and unwieldy.192 Finally, tighter enforcement of 
the tax provisions, coupled with closing loopholes, will give greater effi-
cacy to and respect for the United States taxation system.193 
Conclusion 
The United States Congress should learn from both the domestic 
debate and the Canadian experiment regarding international corpo-
rate tax reform, since a change in tax policy could bring a meaningful 
stream of revenue to our country in its time of crisis. It is better for the 
United States to abandon taxation on foreign subsidiaries than to con-
tinue the farce of stated taxation that does not actually occur. With the 
advent of the global economic crisis, the time is ideal for an overhaul of 
our taxation system to close loopholes, encourage growth, and spur the 
global economy without hollow threats of impossible taxation. 
Section 965 was helpful as a herald for change in the taxation of 
international controlled corporations, but that call was ignored in 
2004. Now with the economic crisis in full force, the United States 
Congress has a duty to reevaluate the international corporate taxation 
system, beginning with a reintroduction of section 965. The financial 
gains from repatriations will then fuel a more complete overhaul of the 
system, closing loopholes which allow transfer of assets abroad and eli-
minating taxes that other developed nations have abandoned. These 
steps will ensure a more effective taxation system and more robust 
competition by U.S.-based multinationals. 
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